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The current state of prisoner litigation in the United States is both 
inefficient and ineffective.  Cases like Dobbey v. Illinois Dept. of 
Corrections demonstrate that adopting a broad interpretation of the 
right to petition is the only way to reform prisoner litigation. Dobbey 
is a curious decision handed down through the pen of Judge Richard 
Posner. The question was whether the plaintiff, a prisoner, failed to 
state a claim against individual defendants, prison employees, 
regarding an alleged violation of his First Amendment right to 
petition.1 This was an issue which Judge Posner conceived as 
“difficult” because the right to petition “is little discussed either in 
cases or in commentaries . . . and its scope is unsettled.”2 At the early 
procedural phase of the Dobbey litigation, Judge Posner did not rule or 
even comment on the merits of the claim but, instead, focused on the 
circuit split regarding the right to petition.3 On the one hand, Judge 
Posner argued that the Seventh Circuit interprets a prisoner’s right to 
                                                 
* J.D. candidate, May 2011, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.A., 2008, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. 
1 Dobbey v. Ill. Dep’t of Corrs., 574 F.3d 443, 444 (7th Cir. 2009). 
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petition under the First Amendment narrowly, contrasting the Seventh 
Circuit with the broader view of the Tenth Circuit.4 While Judge 
Posner attempted to distinguish between the purported narrow Seventh 
Circuit interpretation and the broad Tenth Circuit view, the true effect 
of his opinion in Dobbey is to expose flaws in the grievance 
procedures which restrict inmates’ First Amendment right to petition. 
Judge Posner’s discussion of the circuit split can be explained as an 
outgrowth from a larger problem: the prisoner grievance system in 
Illinois State Prisons. Further, Dobbey can be viewed as a jumping off 
point for a broad policy debate concerning this inmate grievance 
system, and why it fails to guarantee prisoners their constitutionally 
guaranteed right to petition. The inmate grievance system is so overly 
restrictive that as a consequence the inmates’ right to petition is 
severely abridged. This abridging of the right has severely dissipated 
inmates’ abilities to bring meritorious claims in Federal Courts. Our 
inquiry must be then, what should the Seventh Circuit’s analysis be in 




This comment will examine Dobbey and the effect a failed inmate 
grievance procedure has upon an inmate’s first amendment right to 
petition. First, this article provides a general explanation of the right to 
petition, describing the right and how it fits into our judicial system. 
Next, a more specific background addresses the right to petition in the 
context of inmates such as the plaintiff in Dobbey. Third, an 
examination of the current circuit split between various Circuits, such 
as the Seventh and Tenth Circuits, demonstrates the difference 
between the broad and narrow interpretations of the right to petition. 
Fourth, an analysis shows how a broken prisoner grievance system 
coupled with a narrow interpretation of the right to petition severely 
handicaps prisoners attempting to bring causes of action against the 
prison system. Fifth, this article argues that a broad interpretation of 
the right to petition is the best way to secure justice for prisoners 
                                                 
4 Id. at 446–47. 
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petitioning the courts for redress. Finally, this comment will offer to 
the Illinois Department of Corrections and prisons alike, on how best 
to begin the process of redrafting their prisoner grievance systems. 
The right to petition is “among the most precious of the liberties 
safeguarded by the Bill of Rights.”5 It is included in the First 
Amendment, which states “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the 
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances.”6 The right to petition not only represents the 
power to speak against injustices, but also represents the tools with 
which to change those injustices.7 Essentially, a “petition” is an 
address directly to the government requesting it examine an alleged 
failure.8 It is important to note that the First Amendment does not 
protect the mere act of petitioning the government, but only extends 
the right to situations where an individual’s other First Amendment 
rights are implicated, for instance free speech.9 Meaningful access to 
the courts and the other expressive rights contained in the First 
Amendment must be two parts of a greater whole.10 Thus a right to 
petition claim must implicate some other First Amendment right.11 
Although the petition clause was effectively ignored for much of U.S. 
Constitutional history, the United States Supreme Court has held that 
                                                 
5 United Mine Workers of Am. Dist. 12 v. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217, 
222 (1967). 
6 U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). 
7 Elisia Hahnenberg, Right to Petition Government (The), Learning to Give: 
Curriculum Division of the LEAGUE, 
http://learningtogive.org/papers/paper204.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2009). 
8 Foraker v. Chaffinch, 501 F.3d 231, 236 (3rd Cir. 2007) (citing the rule laid 
out in Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983)). 
9 WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 197 F.3d 367, 372 (9th Cir. 1999). It is 
important to note that Dobbey explicitly complies with this standard set out by the 
Court. The plaintiff in Dobbey implicated First Amendment free speech protections 
when he reported the incident to the media and voiced his concerns within the jail. 
10 Cf. id. 
11 See id. 
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“[t]he very idea of government, republican in form, implies a right on 
the part of its citizens to . . . petition for a redress of grievances.”12 In 
practice, this fundamental right has acquired considerably more 
attention from the courts over the past several years.13  
 
B. Historical Development 
 
Since its first appearance in the Magna Carta,14 the right to 
petition has slowly evolved into a fixture of Anglo-American law.15 In 
1215, the right to petition was one of the several concessions King 
John extended to the English barons in adopting the Magna Carta.16 
The Magna Carta states, “[i]f we or . . . any of our servants offend 
against anyone in any way . . . four barons shall come to us or our 
justiciar, if we are out of the kingdom, and shall bring it to our notice 
and ask that we will have it redressed without delay.”17 Under the 
Magna Carta, English subjects used its form of “petitioning” to 
communicate with the King and the early Parliament.18 In 1689, the 
English Bill of Rights adopted a provision stating subjects had the 
right to petition the King, and allowing for the redress of grievances 
towards parliament to be addressed frequently.19 Even though 
                                                 
12 Shireen A. Barday, Comment, FEC v. Wisconsin Right to . . . Petition? A 
Comment on FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 61 STAN. L. REV. 443, 445(2008) 
(quoting United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875)). 
13 Carol Rice Andrews, After Be & K: The “Difficult Constitution Question” of 
Defining the First Amendment Right to Petition Courts, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 1299, 
1300 (2003). 
14 Id. at 1303 n.14 (translating text of the Magna Carta which states: "[I]f we or 
... any of our servants offend against anyone in any way . . . four barons shall come 
to us or our justiciar, if we are out of the kingdom, and shall bring it to our notice 
and ask that we will have it redressed without delay"). 
15 Id. at 1303 
16 Id. 
17 MAGNA CARTA, ch. 61 (1215), translated and reprinted in J.C. HOLT, 
MAGNA CARTA 333-35 (1965). 
18 Id. at 1303.  
19 BILL OF RIGHTS (1689), reprinted in BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 43 (1st vol. 1971). 
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“petitioning was legitimized through written guarantees during th[is] 
period, the right was not always tolerated in practice.”20 From its 
initial adoption in the thirteenth century Magna Carta, and for 500 
years thereafter, petitioning the government was not a realistic right 
because petitioners were frequently punished.21 The true right to 
petition was slowly accepted over time by the government in power.22 
The right to petition was first recognized in colonial America 
when colonists petitioned their assemblies for resolution of private 
disputes as well as for legislative action.23 Petitions in Colonial 
America were a valuable and well-established right prior to the 
drafting and adoption of the First Amendment.24 While colonial times 
marked a strong increase in petitions against legislatures, the historical 
context of the First Amendment allows petitions against all branches 
of government.25 This was not the case in practice, however, and the 
right to petition has only recently been extended to the judicial branch 
of government.26 This past practice dictated that the initial fight to 
gain court access for the redress of governmental wrongs cente
primarily on due process and not the First Amendment.
red 
                                                
27 Ultimately, 
the Court established the right to petition as applied to the courts “in 
two entirely different contexts—association and antitrust cases.”28 The 
Supreme Court’s landmark decision in NAACP v. Button held that 
“litigation may well be the sole practicable avenue open for a minority 
 
20 Julie M. Spanbauer, The First Amendment Right to Petition Government for 
a Redress of Grievances: Cut from a Different Cloth, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 15, 
19–20 (1993) (citing Norman B. Smith, “Shall Make No Law Abridging…”: An 
Analysis Of The Neglected, But Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 1153, 1154 (1986)). 
21 Id. at 20. 
22 Id. 
23 Stephen A. Higginson, Note, A Short History of the Right to Petition 
Government for the Redress of Grievances, 96 YALE L.J. 142, 144–55 (1986). 
24 Id. at 155–56. 
25 Andrews, supra note 13, at 1305. 
26 See id. 
27 See id. 
28 Id. at 1306. 
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to petition the government for redress of grievances.”29 This landmark 
decision was the beginning of a more broadly accepted judicial right to 
petition the government, which was eventually extended to prison 
inmates. 
 
C. Inmates and the Right to Petition 
 
Like all Americans, prisoners enjoy the right to petition the 
government for redress of grievances. This right includes inmates’ 
access to the courts for purposes of presenting their complaints 
regarding the condition of their detention.30 Additionally, prisoners are 
guaranteed access to a law library or to someone trained in the law 
during incarceration.31 In essence, the right to petition allows inmates 
to bring actions in federal courts to recover for damages wrongfully 
inflicted upon them by prison administrators.32 The United States 
Department of Justice certified a formal inmate grievance procedure in 
1992, officially recognizing the right.33  
While many Americans enjoy a direct path to the right to petition, 
inmates have been subject to harsher restrictions on their right to 
address our government. In reality, the process involved in an inmate’s 
successful right to petition can be extremely confusing for a prisoner. 
Adopted in 1996, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires 
inmates bringing civil rights lawsuits to first file internal grievances 
with jailhouse authorities before contemplating suit.34 The PLRA was 
established as a reaction to the overwhelming number of prisoner civil 
rights suits brought under both 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the 
                                                 
29 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963). 
30 See generally Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941). 
31 See generally White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945). 
32 See generally Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). 
33 FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 33-103.001, available at 
https://www.flrules.org/gateway/ruleNo.asp?id= 33-103.001. 
34 See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 
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Constitution.35 From 1990 to 1996, the number of suits filed in federal 
court by inmates almost doubled.36 This large volume of cases 
imposed substantial costs on the litigation system, and in 1995 civil 
rights suits constituted thirteen percent of all civil cases in federal 
district courts.37 At the core of the PLRA is its screening 
requirement.38 In an attempt to reduce the amount of prisoner 
litigation, the PLRA provides that, “[n]o action shall be brought with 
respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any 
other Federal Law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other 
correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available 
are exhausted.”39 In enacting this law, “Congress sought to curb what 
was perceived to be an overwhelming number of frivolous prisoner 
lawsuits.”40 By definition, an action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an 
arguable basis either in law or in fact.”41 Cases which are frivolous, 
malicious, or fail to state a claim on which relief can be granted, as 
well as cases that seek damages from a defendant who is immune from 
such damages are quickly dismissed.42  
Under these standards set out in the PLRA, the internal grievance 
process in some states is quite tedious.43 Regulations often require 
inmates to name the officers who wronged them and write out 
comprehensive descriptions of the alleged wrong to avoid dismissal of 
their cases.44 These requirements prove nearly impossible for many 
                                                 
35 Kermit Roosevelt III, Exhaustion Under The Prison Litigation Reform Act: 




39 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 
40 SAVE, REFORM THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT (PLRA) 1, 
www.savecoalition.org/pdfs/save_final_report.pdf. 
41 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). 
42 Id. 




Belich: <em>Dobbey v. Illinois Department of Corrections</em>: A Small Pi
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2009
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                          Volume 5, Issue 1                            Fall 2009 
inmates.45 And under the PLRA, an inmate may exercise his First 
Amendment right to petition only after the inmate has completely 
exhausted his administrative remedies under the prison’s internal 
grievance process.46 From a legal perspective, the grievance process is 
a sound way to ensure inmate-initiated lawsuits are minimized.47 This 
policy has an obvious rationale: “[T]he administrative agency must 
first be given an opportunity to solve its own problems; and, the 
administrative record developed by the appeals process is invaluable 
to a reviewing court in understanding the issues in controversy, and 
often saves the court the time and expense of an evidentiary 
hearing.”48 Finally, from a practical perspective, many people believe 
that if inmates are told the grievance process available to them 
requires complaints to be submitted directly to institution staff, they 
may not bother seeking formal redress, thus minimizing lawsuits.49 
These requirements set forth in the PLRA effectively deter many 
prospective prisoner plaintiffs from effectively pursuing litigation, but 
the obstacles for a prisoner plaintiff do not end once the administrative 
requirements are met. In the Seventh Circuit, precedent has established 
a narrow reading of the first amendment right to petition which further 
burdens potential inmate plaintiffs. 
 
                                                 
45 See Inmate Grievance Was Good Enough for Follow-Up Lawsuit, 
http://secondcircuitcivilrights.blogspot.com/2009/02/inmate-grievance-was-good-
enough-for.html (Feb. 2, 2009, 10:36 EST). 
46 Id. 
47 Marty Drapkin, Does Your Inmate Grievance Policy Protect You?, 
CORRECTIONSONE, June 2, 2009,  
http://www.correctionsone.com/corrections/articles/1844067-Does-your-inmate-
grievance-policy-protect-you/. 
48 Tom Watson, Prison System Part 1: Fear of Retaliation Discourages 
Prisoners From Filing Appeals and Other Problems, THREE-STRIKES-LEGAL.COM, 
http://three-strikes-legal.com/fear_of_retaliation.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2010).  
49 Cf. Drapkin, supra note 47. 
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A CIRCUIT SPLIT 
 
Although the right to petition appears straight forward on its face, 
a Circuit split in the federal court system has rendered it convoluted at 
best. Different courts have developed clashing interpretations of the 
right to petition clause and which complaints qualify for its protection. 
Decisions in the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
illustrate that the former has chosen a more narrow approach, with the 
latter giving the right more fluidity.50 
Seventh Circuit decisions state that “dispute[s] cannot be 
constitutionalized merely by filing a legal action.”51 This reasoning 
has been followed by the Fourth Circuit and Ninth Circuit as well.52 
The Seventh Circuit has been reluctant to construe the rule broadly, 
arguing that “[a]ny abridgement of the right to free speech is merely 
the incidental effect of observing an otherwise legitimate 
regulation.”53 Altman v. Hurst narrowly defined the right to petition, 
holding that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the right is limited 
to political expression and does not extend to the general right to bring 
suit in the federal courts.54 In Altman, the plaintiff was a police 
sergeant employed in Hickory Hills, Illinois.55 The plaintiff contended 
that his First Amendment rights were violated when he was punished 
for allegedly encouraging a fellow officer to appeal her suspension.56 
His conduct was deemed to be merely a private dispute rather than a 
matter of public concern, and was therefore dismissed from federal 
                                                 
50 Dobbey v. Ill. Dep’t of Corrs., 574 F.3d 443, 446 (7th Cir. 2009). 
51 Id. at 446–47 (quoting Altman v. Hurst, 734 F.2d 1240, 1244 n.10 (7th Cir. 
1984) (per curiam)). 
52 Kirby v. City Of Elizabeth City, 388 F.3d 440, 448 (4th Cir. 2004) (stating, 
therefore, that claims must be a matter of public concern in order to be 
constitutionally protected); see also Rendish v. City of Tacoma, 123 F.3d 1216, 1221 
(9th Cir. 1997). 
53 Lawline v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 956 F.2d 1378, 1386 (7th Cir. 1992). 
54 See 734 F.2d at 1244 n.10. 
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court.57 Further, the court in Moss v. Westerman stated that a claim 
must be more than a personal gripe, must present an issue affecting all 
prisoners, and must question a policy that affects the prison as a 
whole.58 Finally, perhaps the Seventh Circuit’s most deliberate 
pronouncement of its narrow view is Yatvin v. Madison Metropolitan 
School District. In Yatvin, the plaintiff, a woman, applied for an 
assistant superintendent position in a particular school district.59 She 
was one of four candidates, the other three being men.60 When two of 
the men were recommended for the position, the plaintiff claimed sex 
discrimination and filed charges with the appropriate agencies.61 
Following this incident, she applied for a different administrative 
position in the same school district.62 Two women, including the 
plaintiff, and two men had applied.63 The other woman was chosen for 
the job, prompting the plaintiff to claim this was in retaliation for her 
filing the sex discrimination charges.64 The court asserted that “[t]he 
contention that every act of retaliation against a person who files 
charges of wrongdoing with a public agency denies freedom of speech 
or the right to petition for redress of grievances . . . is simply stated too 
broadly.”65 In short, the court held not every “legal gesture or 
pleading” is protected by the First Amendment.66 
As to the Seventh Circuit’s view in the context of an inmate, 
Parker v. Walker helps define the court’s narrow interpretation of the 
right to petition, making clear that an inmate’s life is controlled by 
                                                 
57 Id. 
58 No. 04-CV-0570-MJR, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1481, at *8 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 9, 
2008). 










Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 8
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol5/iss1/8
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                          Volume 5, Issue 1                            Fall 2009 
prison officials down to the smallest detail.67 The plaintiff had filed 
numerous grievances against the prison staff, after they filed a 
disciplinary report against him, alleging that he needed protective 
custody in the prison and should not have to obey the staff and go back 
to “general population.”68 Ultimately, the board denied plaintiff’s 
grievances.69 The Court did not “understand the Constitution as 
providing a remedy for every slight or petty annoyance that befalls an 
inmate even if done with retaliatory intent . . . . [The retaliatory act] 
must rise above the inconsequential and trivial.”70 Moreover, the 
Court stated that occurrences lacking adverse material affect are 
simply part of the unpleasantness of prison life which does not gi
rise to a retaliation claim.
ve 
an incident.  
                                                
71 Even if a defendant’s acts have material 
affected the plaintiff inmate, the complaints and grievances must be 
“related to matters of public concern” and not be merely a personal 
gripe about 72
In contrast, the Tenth Circuit has defined the right in an 
exceedingly broad manner.73 Courts have stated that any form of 
official retaliation in response to a person utilizing their freedom of 
speech is actionable.74 The court set forth a three prong test in Worrell 
v. Henry for unlawful retaliation by government officials in response 




67 See No. 08-CV-152-MJR, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90195, at *13 (S.D. Ill. 
Nov. 6. 2008). 
68 Id. at *3–4. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at *14 (stating that minor changes in a prisoner’s life that lack a material 
adverse affect fit this category). 
72 Id. at *16 (citation omitted). 
73 See Dobbey v. Ill. Dep’t of Corrs., 574 F.3d 443, 447 (7th Cir. 2009).  
74 219 F.3d 1197, 1212 (10th Cir. 2000) (stating that this includes prosecution, 
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(1) that [he or she] was engaged in constitutionally protected 
activity; (2) that the defendant’s actions caused the plaintiff to 
suffer an injury that would chill a person of ordinary firmness 
from continuing to engage in that activity; and (3) that the 
defendant’s adverse action was substantially motivated as a 
response to the plaintiff’s exercise of constitutionally 
protected conduct.76  
 
In Worrell, the plaintiff claimed his First Amendment rights were 
violated when he testified for the defense in capital murder case, 
causing the District Attorney’s office to rescind a job offer to him.77  
The Court stated that the plaintiff is afforded “the benefit of all 
favorable inferences,” and that as long as there was evidence to 
support the factors, he is engaging in constitutionally protected 
activity.78  This broad reasoning has been adopted by the Third and 
Fifth Circuits.79 However, the courts have cautioned that petitions 
made through informal channels may be given a lesser degree of 
constitutional protection than their formal counterparts.80  
This broad view was demonstrated in Van Deelen v. Johnson, 
where the Court found that a private citizen expressed a 
constitutionally protected First Amendment right anytime he or she 
petitions the government for redress.81 The court further stated claims 
that are minor and questionable, as well as claims that are mighty and 
consequential, are all welcomed.82 Further, the court stated that 
matters of public concern are not required for addressing the 
                                                 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 1202. 
78 Id. at 1213–1214. 
79 See Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216, 230 (3d. Cir. 2008); Izen v. 
Catalina, 398 F.3d 363, 367 (5th Cir. 2005). 
80 Foraker v. Chaffinch, 501 F.3d 231, 237 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing San Filippo v. 
Bongiovanni, 30 F.3d 424, 439–40 (3d Cir. 1994)). 
81 497 F.3d 1151, 1156 (10th Cir. 2007). 
82 Id. at 1157 n.6 (citing McCook v. Springer Sch. Dist., 44 F. App’x 896, 903–
04 (10th Cir. 2002)). 
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constitutionality of a First Amendment right to petition claim.83 
Rather, a plaintiff’s First Amendment claim can survive on the ground 
that at least some of the speech at issue involved public concern.84 
What’s more, private citizens are considered in a broader context of 
free expression protected under the First Amendment in contrast to 
public employees.85 In sum, the Tenth Circuit suggests that the First 
Amendment petition clause does not pick and choose its causes.86  
This broad interpretation of the right to petition is not without 
limits. In Ellibee v. Higgins the court stated that a plaintiff “must 
demonstrate an actual injury to his ability to pursue a non-frivolous 
legal claim.”87 This actual injury, the court reasoned, is needed in 
order to show that the defendant interfered with the plaintiff’s First 
Amendment right to pursue grievances and participate in litigation.88 
Additionally, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the injury would 
dissuade a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to participate 
in that activity.89 These commonsense limits imposed by the Tenth 
Circuit still focus on keeping frivolous prisoner claims out of federal 
courts, but do so in a way that respects prisoner’s ultimate right to 
bring a suit under the right to petition. In the analysis that follows, 
flaws in the narrow interpretation of the right to petition become 
strikingly clear. 
 
A. The Facts of Dobbey v. Illinois Department of Corrections 
 
Turning to the case at issue, Dobbey v. Illinois Department of 
Corrections is an extraordinary illustration of the current tension in the 
                                                 




87 No. 4-3402-CM, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8777, at *6 (D. Kan. Feb. 13, 
2006). 
88Id. 
89 Id. (citing Poole v. County of Otero, 271 F.3d 995, 960 (10th Cir. 2001)). 
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courts over the proper interpretation of an inmate’s right to petition.90 
The plaintiff, Lester Dobbey, is a black inmate at the Menard 
Correctional Facility, an Illinois state prison.91 During his five years at 
the prison, Lester Dobbey worked as a staff janitor, and had no record 
of problems or altercations with the prison staff.92 However, signs of 
trouble first began while five white prison security guards were 
playing cards in the main control room, also called the “officers’ 
cage.”93 Dobbey had just entered the breakfast room with two other 
black inmates and began preparing breakfast trays with them.94 During 
this time, he was able to see the inside of the officers’ cage. Dobbey 
looked into the cage and allegedly observed one of the guards who got 
up from the card game to hang a noose from the ceiling.95 According 
to Dobbey, the guard then proceeded to swat the noose so that it swung 
back and forth, and sat down to watch it “looking crazy with evil 
eyes”.96 All three black inmates saw the swinging noose hung by the 
guard in the officers’ cage.97 Approximately twenty minutes later, 
another guard allegedly took down the noose.98 Dobbey filed a 
grievance with prison authorities complaining of the guard’s 
intimidating conduct.99  
The following day, Dobbey sent letters describing the intimidating 
noose incident to various media outlets and state officials.100 
Approximately one month later, a prison disciplinary charge was filed 
                                                 
90 See generally John E. Wolfgram, How the Judiciary Stole the Right to 
Petition, 31 U. WEST L.A. L. REV. 1, 3 (2000)  available at 
http://www.constitution.org/abus/wolfgram/ptnright.htm.  
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against Dobbey for allegedly disobeying a guard’s order. The order 
instructed Dobbey that he must scrape wax off a section of floor in the 
prison.101 Dobbey asserted that he was scraping diligently even though 
the task was demeaning, but claims the guard told him, “you’re on 
Bullshit around here.”102 As a result of the disciplinary charge, 
Dobbey was terminated from his janitorial job and various other 
sanctions were imposed upon him by prison administrators.103 Dobbey 
felt that he was assigned the menial work tasks and ultimately 
terminated from his job because he complained of the conduct of the 
prison guards. When he inquired as to the denial of his grievance, 
Dobbey was told that his grievance regarding the noose incident was 
denied because “there was no evidence of the noose.” Dobbey 







of whether the district judge was correct in his belief that Dobbey’s 
                                                
r employees.104  
Dobbey then filed suit, alleging cruel and unusual punishm
well as retaliation by the prison guards for exercising his First 
Amendment right to petition when he filed an internal grievance wi
prison authorities.105 Dobbey stated that “the defendants retaliated 
against him for his exercising his First Amendment rights—in other 
words, they punished him for his speech—and if this is correct they 
violated the amendment and by doing so gave him a valid basis for 
suing them under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”106 The district judge dismi
the suit before service of process, on the authority of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A, which, in regards to Dobbey, directs dismissal if the 
complaint fails to state a claim or if it seeks monetary relief from an 






105 Id. at 445–46. 
106 Id. at 446. 
107 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2); Dobbey, 574 F.3d at 446. 
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complaint failed to state a claim for violation of the First Amendment 
right to petition against the defendants.108 
 
B. Judge Posner’s Analysis 
 
Judge Posner reversed and remanded Dobbey’s retaliation claim, 
as it was clear to him that the complaint contained sufficient 
allegations of retaliation. However, since the district court dismissed 
Dobbey’s complaint before any discovery, no analysis of the 
substantive issues was possible without additional fact-finding.109 
Judge Posner stated, “we must assume that the plaintiff's punishment 
for allegedly failing to scrape wax as ordered was indeed retaliation 
for filing a grievance about, and for publicizing the noose incident, so 
that the issue to be resolved is whether the filing or the publicizing 
was protected by the First Amendment.”110 Noting the lack of a 
developed record, Judge Posner offered “no opinion on the ultimate 
merits of that claim because further development of the record may 
cast the facts in a different light from the complaint.”111 While Judge 
Posner’s opinion did not bring any finality to Dobbey’s case, his 
discussion of the differing views of courts as to the right to petition 
opened the door to a deeper policy concern, highlighting the 
difficulties for inmate petitions which stem in part from the 
inadequacy of the inmate grievance system.  
 
THE IMPORTANCE OF INMATES’ ABILITY TO BRING A CLAIM 
 
An examination of inmates’ right to bring a cause of action is 
essential to an understanding of the flawed narrow view of the right to 
petition and is consistent with a theory that a broad interpretation of 
the right is required. Moreover, it sheds light on how the right to 
petition is severely limited and restricted, landing an inmate’s exercise 
                                                 
108 Dobbey, 574 F.3d at 446. 
109 Id. at 447. 
110 Id. at 446. 
111 Id. at 447. 
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of the right in jeopardy. A prisoner’s “right to complain in whatever 
form he or she chooses about government official conduct lies at the 
core of First Amendment freedoms.”112 This right clearly extends to 
prisoners abilities to file grievances with prison authorities, and 
ultimately ability to file a lawsuit. Fundamentally, public officials’ 
actions, including prison personnel, are subject to criticism and 
debate.113 Prisoners and citizens alike involved in this issue should not 
be subjected to the threat of retaliation when they speak out on such 
issues.114 The prevention of inmate litigation through retaliation for 
filing grievances runs afoul of the first amendment right to petition 
because “stat[ing] that one class of individuals may not participate [in 
petitioning the government] in the same manner as all others is clearly 
a violation of this principle.”115 Courts have held that even if a public 
officer suffers inconvenience, embarrassment, or damage to reputation 
as a result of public criticism akin to inmate complaints and litigation, 
it is simply a burden which “unfortunately all civil servants may be 
called upon occasionally to shoulder as part of the obligation of the 
job.”116  
As previously discussed, the PLRA requires inmates to file 
internal grievances within their prison system before suing. This 
requirement alone makes the PLRA problematic, causing a serious 
obstacle to inmates’ right to petition. Not only has the Seventh Circuit 
noted that “[i]ts provisions have never seriously been debated,” it has 
been accurately criticized as a product of “haste” which lacks a 
                                                 
112 LYNNE WILSON, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION COUNTERCLAIMS AND THE 
RIGHT OF PETITION IN POLICE MISCONDUCT SUITS 11–12,  
 http://www.nlg-npap.org/html/research/LWmailiciousprosecution.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 25, 2009). 
113Id. 
114 Id. 
115Diverse Coalition of Organizations Call for White House to Rescind Rule 
Restricting Lobbyist Communications on Bailout Funds, CREW, Mar. 31, 2009, 
http://www.citizensforethics.org/node/38370. 
116 Wilson, supra note 112 (quoting Greenberg v. City of N.Y. Mun. Bldg., 
392 N.Y.S.2d 547, 550 (1977)). 
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committee report.117 Senate records indicate that there is no defined 
scope to the legislation, and there is no discussion of its intended 
effects upon meritorious First Amendment prisoner claims.118 As a 
result, more than just frivolous litigation is suppressed.119 If the PLRA 
was intended to selectively discourage the filing of frivolous or 
meritless lawsuits, as proponents argue, then it should follow that 
prisoners are winning a larger percentage of their lawsuits after the 
enactment of the PLRA.120 However, “the most comprehensive study 
to date shows just the opposite: since the passage of the PLRA, 
prisoners not only are filing fewer lawsuits, but also are succeeding in 
a smaller proportion of the cases they do file.”121  
 
While it appears there was little debate in Congress regarding 
the potential impact of § 1997e(e), there were many anecdotal 
references to the most notorious frivolous prisoner claims. 
The most touted among these included suits for an 
unsatisfactory haircut, disappointment at not being invited to 
a pizza party, having inadequate locker space, and being 
served chunky instead of creamy peanut butter. These cases, 
though purportedly examples of actual prisoner suits, are 
hardly representative of prisoner suits as a whole. Nor do 
they reflect the merits of cases brought by prisoners subjected 
to egregious violations of their civil rights.122 
 
                                                 
117 Corbett H. Williams, Evisceration of The First Amendment: The Prison 
Litigation Reform Act and Interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1997E(E) In Prisoner First 
Amendment Claims, 39 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 859, 863 (2006). 
118 Id. at 864. 
119 Id. 
120HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: THE PRISON LITIGATION 
REFORM ACT IN THE UNITED STATES 35 (2009), 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0609web.pdf. 
121 Id. 
122 Williams, supra note 117, at 860–861. 
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This is a strong indication that the PLRA has skewed the right to 
petition against prisoners.123 Inmate cases remain those matters filed 
by individuals spurned by society, and the cases are seldom 
successful.124 As a result, prisoners’ cases are often presumed 
frivolous by the people responsible for reading and evaluating the 
petitions filed by those prisoners.125 Ultimately, the empirical da
objectively demonstrates that the PLRA’s standards have impose
and difficult obstacles which result in even constitutionally 




                                                
The PLRA has prevented inmates from raising legitimate claims 
because more cases are dismissed and fewer are settled.127 
Constitutionally meritorious cases are faced with insurmountable 
obstacles.128 Inmates are consistently harmed in cases that are 
dismissed notwithstanding their constitutional merit, which 
compromises “the entire system of accountability that ensures prison 
and jail officials comply with constitutional mandates.”129 Serious 
cases, such as those involving retaliation, are dismissed because the 
PLRA bars even meritorious claims from court if an inmate has not 
accurately complied with the numerous technical requirements of the 
prison grievance system.130 Furthermore, officials involved in 
grievance procedures, such as wardens, jailers, and sheriffs, all have a 
 
123 Id. 
124 Christopher E. Smith, The Governance of Corrections: Implications of the 
Changing Interface of Courts and Corrections, 2 CRIM. JUST. 113, 129 (2000). 
125 Id. (citing law clerks, U.S. magistrates, and district judges as responsible for 
“reading and evaluating petitions filed by prisoners”). 
126 Williams, supra note 117, at 860–861. 
127 MARGO SCHLANGER & GIOVANNI SHAY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 
SOCIETY FOR LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY, PRESERVING THE RULE OF LAW IN 
AMERICA’S PRISONS: THE CASE FOR AMENDING THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM 




129 Id. at 2. 
130 Id. at 9. 
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common interest “in avoiding adverse judgments against themselves 
or their colleagues.”131 Correctional administrators are largely aware 
of the potential benefits of effective grievance procedures, “including 
the provision of information with respect to existing problems and 
needed adjustments, the improvement of the facility’s credibility with 
courts, the provision of documentation in the event that inmates file 
suit, and the resolution of issues before they reach the courts.”132 
However, it is still obvious, whether by failure or design, that 
grievance procedures are widely ineffective.133 
In further evaluating the flaws in prison policies behind cases 
such as Dobbey, it is appropriate to look to the system’s effect on the 
inmates, including their perception of the system’s ability to protect 
their rights. First, it is natural for an inmate to feel aggrieved because 
they are in the custody of state or federal prison authorities.134 Simply 
put: “prisons are not intended to be pleasant places.”135 Despite this, a 
prisoner has all the legal rights of an ordinary citizen with the 
exception of those expressly or impliedly taken by the law.136 
Grievance procedures play a key role in ensuring the protection of 
rights in hierarchal settings, such as prisons.137 These correctional 
institutions represent one of the most rigid and authoritarian patterns 
of social organization.138 While in prison, inmates are utterly subject 
to the coercive power of the state, acting through the institution.139 
This power is only legitimately exercised as long as the rights retained
by inmates are protected.
 
ir 
                                                
140 In fact, prisoners who are not given fa
 
131 Id. at 10. 
132 David M. Adlerstein, The “Iron Triangle” of the Prison Litigation Reform 
Act, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1694 (2001). 
133 Id. 




138 Id. at n.8. 




Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 8
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol5/iss1/8
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                          Volume 5, Issue 1                            Fall 2009 
grievance procedures may be further inclined to “externalize” their 
displeasure with the system toward other inmates, prison officials, or 
the general public once released.141 An inmate’s perception of the 
grievance process is a crucial and often undervalued part of the 
analysis.142 While the inmate grievance procedure can be a beneficial 
and useful tool for inmates, if they are not assured using the process 
will result in solving problems or addressing issues, they will forgo 
using the process.143 “Many inmates regard the grievance procedure as 
a last resort, some because they insist that they will be labeled a 
complainer or a troublemaker, and believe retaliation will occur, so 
that problems will only increase if they use the grievance 
procedure.”144 “Further, as evidenced by the persistence of § 1983 
litigation, inmates are often dissatisfied with the disposition of 
grievances. Apart from the limited scope of available remedies, 
corrections administrators may be predisposed toward upholding 
institutional policy and supporting subordinate officers.”145 Due to this 
perception of the grievance system by prisoners, many inmates attempt 
to have problems resolved by alternative and unfavorable means.146 
Many inmates even attempt in-person communication with staff 
members before they ever consider using the grievance procedure.147 
Additionally, a basic structural problem exists within grievance 
process’s exhaustion requirements because prison officials themselves 
both design the grievance system that prisoners must exhaust before 
filing suit and find themselves as the defendants in most lawsuits 
brought by prisoners.148 This generates an incentive for prison officials 
                                                 
141 Id. 
142 CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTE INSPECTION COMMITTEE, INMATE GRIEVANCE 




145 Adlerstein, supra note 132, at 1696. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
148 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 120, at 12. 
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to design grievance systems with short deadlines, multiple steps, and 
numerous technical requirements.149 “Perversely, it actually 
undermines internal accountability as well, by encouraging prisons to 
come up with high procedural hurdles, and to refuse to consider the 
merits of serious grievances, in order to best preserve a defense of 
non-exhaustion.”150 Unfortunately, the PLRA imposes no limits or 
requirements for grievance systems and allows the sky as “the limit for 
the procedural complexity or difficulty of the exhaustion regime.”151 
The lack of grievance system requirements by design tends to 
discourage rather that facilitate compliance by prisoners.152 For 
instance, some prison’s systems require that the prisoner first raise the 
issue of which he is complaining with the staff member involved, even 
if the grievance entails abusive conduct or assault by that staff 
member.153 Requirements like this can severely hinder a complaint’s 
ability to make it through the grievance process from start to finish, 
thus allowing the inmate to bring a claim in court. Furthermore, a 
prisoner’s “failure to coherently set forth the nature of a grievance, to 
limit grievances to one per form, and to file within a prescribed (and 
typically brief) period” are additional problems that may end in 
dismissal, forever barring a prisoner from redress.”154 In instances 
where grievances are denied, the prisoners often do not receive 
adequate explanation of the reason behind the ruling against their 
grievance.155 The rationale behind this is that most prison officials 
lack the education and understanding to formulate an adequate and 
concise grievance response.156 But whatever the justification, more 
arduous the grievance rules mean less likelihood that a prison or its 
staff members will be subject to damages or have their conduct 
                                                 
149 Id. 
150 Schlanger & Shay, supra note 127, at 10. 
151 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 120, at 12 (citation omitted). 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
154 Adlerstein, supra note 132, at 1695. 
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enjoined in a subsequent lawsuit.157 The ineffectiveness of these type
of systems has led to a grievance system that may effectively remove
frivolous litigation from the courts, but also frustrates the adequate 






                                                
 
A. Illinois Department of Corrections 
 
Most relevant to the inquiry in this case are the policies of the 
Illinois Department of Corrections, which has a three-step grievance 
procedure. According to Illinois Administrative Code, if a prisoner has 
a grievance or complaint he must first seek the assistance of an inmate 
counselor.159 Second, if the prisoner’s complaint remains unremedied 
despite the help of a counselor, the prisoner may then file a written 
grievance.160 The written grievance is reviewed by a grievance officer 
who submits a recommendation to the chief administrative officer.161 
Finally, if the warden denies the prisoner's grievance, the prisoner has 
30 days in which to appeal the warden's decision to the Director, who 
then may order a hearing before the Administrative Review Board.162 
Only after all of these administrative hurdles are cleared can an inmate 
file a grievance in federal court. 
 Once the action is filed, under Seventh Circuit precedent a 
prisoner must also state a claim of constitutional dimension.163 In 
other words, a state’s inmate grievance procedure alone does not giv
the inmate a liberty interest protected by the constitution.164 Since t
Constitution contains no clause requiring an inmate grievance 
 
157 SCHLANGER & SHAY, supra note 127, at 10. 
158Adlerstein, supra note 132, at 1696–97. 
159Ill. Admin. Code tit. 20, § 504.810; Burrell v. Powers, 431 F.3d 282, 284 
(7th Cir. 2005). 
160 Ill. Admin. Code tit. 20, § 504.810. 
161 Id. § 504.830. 
162 Id. § 504.850. 
163 Bulmer v. Sutton, No. 04-922-JPG, 2006 WL 2644942, at *2 (S.D. Ill. 
September 14, 2006). 
164 Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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procedure, the failure of state prison officials to follow their own 
procedures does not, on its face, violate the Constitution.165 
 However, the Seventh Circuit has held that prison officials 
may not retaliate against inmates for filing grievances or otherwise 
complaining about their conditions of confinement.166 Once a 
complaint is successfully filed upon completion of the grievance 
process, an inmate need only offer the bare minimum facts necessary 
to put the defendant on notice of the claim so that he may file an 
answer.167 To state a claim of improper retaliation, the inmate only has 
to name the suit and the act of retaliation.168 Although inmates do not 
often navigate the grievance system effectively, those that do are 
rewarded by the federal system’s notice pleading standard. The main 
problem for inmates, however, is not pleading retaliation claims, but 
proving them and winning them.  
 
B. Retaliation Occurring After an Inmate Files a Grievance 
Cannot Be Solved by the Same Inadequate Process 
 
Retaliation against inmates is a striking policy concern within the 
inmate grievance system.169 The threat of retaliation makes it clear 
that grievance systems are not functioning correctly, and are not 
effectively allowing inmates to bring a claim. This problem again 
creates the necessity for a broad interpretation of the right to petition 
by courts. Generally, solidarity exists between prison officials against
inmates, which not only has a chilling effect throughout the prison, 
also poses a legitimate concern for retaliatory measures by these 





                                                
170 Inmates who have experienced prison
official retaliation for good faith use of the grievance process m
 
165 See Maust v. Headley, 959 F.2d 644, 648 (7th Cir. 1992). 
166 Walker v. Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005, 1009 (7th Cir. 2002). 
167 Higgs v. Carver, 286 F.3d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 2002). 
168 Id. 
169 CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTE INSPECTION COMMITTEE, supra note 142, at 19. 
170 Adlerstein, supra note 132, at 1696. 
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justifiably hesitant to use the procedure again to report their claim.171 
Inmates that do file grievances with the system “may find . . . that 
retaliation is extremely difficult to prove. Areas of alleged retaliation 
are reported in areas which staff has the authority to exercise 
discretion.”172 A lack of evidence proving that a prison official or staff 
member violated the prohibition against retaliation does not allow any 
disciplinary or corrective action to be taken.173 In other words, an 
inmate disadvantaged by a lack of resources is at a great handicap to 
show proof of retaliation from a correctional officer who has the 
prison system on his side. The presence of retaliation by correctional 
officials may encourage the aggrieved to refrain from bringing suit and 
witnesses to remain silent.174 In other words, they are “[c]ompletely 
dependent on their institutional environments” and thus “particularly 
susceptible to intimidation and frequently afraid to voice their 
grievances.”175 
Dobbey is a perfect example of a case where prison officials have 
claimed “an unfettered right to punish prisoners who complain about 
abuse by prison guards.”176 Legitimatizing retaliatory punishment 
further institutionalizes a culture of impunity within prisons.177 
Prisons have become environments where criticism of official 
misconduct is wildly suppressed behind their walls.178 Prisons are 
known for their insularity from mainstream society.179 This merges 
with their coercive mandate, creating an environment in which abuse 
of authority is an ever-present, yet accountability is severely 
                                                 
171CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTE INSPECTION COMMITTEE, supra note 142, at 19. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. 
174 Adlerstein, supra note 132, at 1691. 
175 S. Rep. No. 95-1056, at 18 (1980). 
176 Brief for Legal Aid Society of the City of New York et al., as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents, Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 418 (2001) (No. 99-1613), 
2000 WL 1845914, at *2. 
177 Id. 
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diminished.180 This creates “a pervasive prison culture of extreme 
loyalty by staff, including the rigid ‘code of silence’ by which staff an






. Problematic Findings by the John Howard Association in the 
 




                                                
181 Inmates w
do complain about abuse or criticize jailer staff are singled out and 
targeted by prison staff for retaliation in order to secure their 
silence.182 This creates a culture that ensures “impunity, . . . fosters 
abuse and permits cover-ups on a scale virtually impossible in free 
society.”183 This retaliation is rampant in the flawed Illinois 
Department of Corrections procedures in place throughout the state
Illinois. Retaliation, and the inability or unwillingness of inmate
bring claims because of it, is one of the main reasons why it is 
necessary for the courts to move to a more broad view of the right 
petition. The grievance procedures currently in place are wholly 
ineffective at discouraging retaliation against inmates. 
 
C
Cook County Department of Corrections Confirms the  
Need for a Broad Right to Petition  
T
ctively denies inmates the right to petition is starkly apparent in 
the John Howard Association’s Duran report. The John Howard 
Association (“JHA”) is the oldest and toughest advocate “for fair
human, and effective incarceration and punishment practices and 
policies” in Illinois.184 In its 21st Duran report, JHA examined the 
conditions of confinement at the Cook County Department of 
Corrections (“CCDOC”).185 A review of the CCDOC’s grievan
 
180 Id. 






CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT AT THE COOK COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF 
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procedure was conducted during March and April 2005 by JHA 
staff.186 JHA took a sampling of ten percent of all inmate grievan
from the 2004 calendar year, using a systematic random sampling 




]uring 2004, nearly one-third (32.6%) of the grievances 
                                                
187 Data from these original 
grievance forms was collected, tabulated, and analyzed to prov
insight into the grievance process for that calendar year.188 The data
revealed the following: 
 
[D
were collected within 24 hours (i.e., 0 - 1 day). This 
represents a significant decrease from the 24-hour collection 
rates of 50.0 percent in 2000, 55.0 percent in 1997 and 52.7 
percent in 1996. Specifically, it represents a 17.4 percent 
decrease from the 2000 collection rate. This is particularly 
important to recognize, because the grievance procedures 
were modified in 2000 in order to provide inmates with a 
more expeditious way of handling complaints, but the data 
suggest that the revisions in the procedure may have had the 
opposite effect. Similarly, only 65.2 percent of grievances 
were collected within three days, showing a decrease in the 
timeliness of collection rates as compared to 67.9 percent in 
2000, 82.5 percent in 1997 and 72.1 percent in 1996. CCDOC 
should look back at what circumstances were in play during 
1997 that yielded faster collection rates. Over one-third 
(34.8%) of the grievances were significantly delayed (i.e. - 4 
or more days) before collection. This is nearly a 3 percent 
increase from the rate of 32.1 percent in 2000. The data 
clearly expresses that the timeliness of grievance collection is 





188 Id. at 15. 
189 Id. at 15–16. 
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 The Department of Justice’s 2007 Investigation of the Cook 
 June and July of 2007, the United States Department of Justice 
(“D
r to seek 
nal 
lematic finding in the JHA’s report.190 In fact, the most s
grievances, for example those involving physical contact with staff, 
elicited the longest average response time.191 Alleged verbal incident
between inmates and staff had an average of nineteen days between 
the filing of a grievances and the time that inmate grievant received a
response, while nonverbal incidents between an inmate and staff had 
an average twenty one day response time.192 These numbers indicate 
an average response time that is almost four times longer than what th
Consent Decree, which sets forth provisions for the adequate 
responses to grievances, requires.193 
 
D.
County Jail Exposes Illinois’ Flawed Grievance Systems and 
the Need for Inmates to Have Broader Access to Court 
 
In
OJ”) conducted an onsite investigation of the Cook County Jail, 
pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act 
(“CRIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997.194 CRIPA gives the DOJ powe
a remedy for a pattern or practice of conduct that violates the 
constitutional rights of inmates in adult detention and correctio
facilities.195 All preliminary findings were communicated to CCJ 
                                                 
190 Id. at 16. 
191 Id
er from Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, to Todd H. 
Strog k County Board President, & Thomas Dart, Cook County Sheriff 
[here
-







inafter DOJ Letter], at 1 (July 11, 2008), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/split/documents/CookCountyJail_findingsletter_7-11
08.pdf. 
19542 U.S.C. § 1997f. CRIPA was enacted in 1980 seeks to remedy 
institutio
 Coo
ials who operate institutions in which a pattern or practice of flagrant 
egregious conditions deprives residents of their constitutional rights. Id. 
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officials, Cook County’s legal counsel, and the Sherriff’s Office 
following the close of the July 2007 visit to the CCJ.196 Overall, the 
DOJ found that certain conditions at the CCJ violate the constitutional 
rights of inmates.197 These onsite inspections were conducted by 
expert consultants in corrections, use of force, custodial medical and 
mental health care, fire safety, and sanitation.198 All types of prison 
staff as well as inmates were interviewed. Before, during, and after the 
DOJ’s visits, its staff reviewed an extensive number of “documents, 
including policies and procedures, incident reports, use of force 
reports, investigative reports, inmate grievances, disciplinary reports, 
unit logs, orientation materials, medical records, and staff training 
materials.”199  
Since the grievance system is a vehicle for inmates to bring prison 
staff misconduct to light, often in the form of retaliation, as in Dobbey, 
it is important to note the DOJ’s examination and findings of the 
CCJ’s staff investigations.200 The DOJ stated that “to ensure 
reasonably safe conditions for inmates, correctional facilities must 
develop and maintain adequate systems to investigate staff 
misconduct, including alleged . . . abuse by staff.”201 Generally 
accepted correctional practices require clear and comprehensive 
policies and practices governing the investigation of staff use of force 
and misconduct.202 The report asserted,  
 
Adequate policies and practices include, at a minimum, 
screening of all grievance reports, specific criteria for 
initiating investigations based upon the report 
screening, specific criteria for investigations based 
upon the report screening, specific criteria for initiating 
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investigations based upon allegations from any sour
timelines for the completion of internal investigations, 
and organized structure and format for recording and 
maintaining information in the investigatory file.
ce, 
Additio ased.204 
The DOJ discovered that the CCJ’s investigatory practice fails on 
y 
o 




 of providing a mechanism 
for a otify 
                                                
203  
 
nally, the investigation must be and appear to be unbi
multiple levels, namely those involving timely investigations.205 
Investigations must be undertaken promptly, or there is risk of the 
incident not being solved.206 In fact, most investigations were onl
undertaken once the inmate filed a lawsuit, which often occurs up t
two years after the initial incident.207 
Through the DOJ’s finding, it is apparent the CCJ investigations 
are reactive and suffer from the appea 208
e often undertaken only because the CCJ was defending an inmate
lawsuit.209 These findings revealed some of the only instances in 
which investigation on staff conduct was opened.210 The CCJ’s 
conduct clearly shows a lack of affirmative action by the jail to re
grievances and move them through the system in an effort to red
inmate problems with institutional staff.  
An inmate grievance system is a fundamental element of a 
functional prison system, with the purpose
llowing inmates to raise confinement-related concerns and n
the administration.211 When inmates view the system as credible, they 
can also serve as a source of intelligence to staff regarding potential 










211 Id. at 40. 
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misconduct.212 Not only should the grievance system be readily 
available and easily accessible to all inmates, but it should als
prisoners to file their grievances in a secure and confidential manner
without threat of reprisal, and have them answered by staff that 














Staff at the CCJ was expected to collect grievances from inmate 
at least twice a week; however, this did not occur on a consistent 
basis.214 Inmates complained of not having access to these staff 
members, and as a result the grievance process, often because they
were locked in their cells during staff rounds.215 Moreover, these
staff members are expected to handle the grievances of over 200 
inmates each.216 To say this is an ambitious task is to put it quite 
lightly.217 
Divisional policy and procedure further requires locked griev
boxes to be
r grievances in.218 Each weekday these grievances are to be 
collected by the previously mentioned appointed staff members.219 
Unfortunately, the grievance system functions quite differently i
practice, and varies between jail divisions and tiers.220 The prevailin
policy, not found in the written policy, is for the inmates to hand th
completed grievances to the staff while they are conducting rounds.221
Staff reported that inmate grievances are to be inserted in confidential 
envelopes sealed by the inmate, another policy not included in written 
divisional policies.222 Some divisions even allow inmates to give 
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completed grievances to a security supervisor who records the 
grievance in a log and gives it to the proper staff member.223 Se
staff in other divisions refuses to handle grievances, citing conflict 









most inmates complained of never hearing back at all after filing a 
                                                
224 The 
aforementioned policies are just a few of the policies found at th
while many other versions exist.225 Even though it is apparent that the 
divisions were not using the required grievance boxes, many staff 
members, including the Program Services Administrator, were und
the faulty assumption that inmates used these boxes.226 Overall, 
“[t]here is an extremely high level of confusion regarding the 
grievance policy and practice at all levels of CCJ.”227 
Access to grievance forms by inmates is another u
lem.228 Often, grievances and the confidential envelopes us
carry them are unavailable on jail tiers and the grievance forms are 
rarely available in languages other than English, such as Spanish, 
which is the only language spoken, read, and understood by many 
inmates.229 The DOJ also found that inmates have little trust in the 
grievance system, believing the process to be unreliable and repeate
complaining about its efficacy, with good cause.230 Inadequate 
responses are given to certain grievances, like, for example, one
concerning use of force.231 Although an investigator will occasion
speak to an inmate filing these types of grievances, inmates state that 
they never heard back again about the grievances.232 Furthermore, 
 
– 41. 




224 Id. at 40
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f Two Illinois Penitentiaries: Vienna Correctional 
Center and Stateville Correctional Center Show that the PLRA 
 In o 
corr al facilities was performed by an author for the American 





                                                
233 In some instances when inmates do receive grievance
responses, the responses contain falsified information from the staff 
member involved in altercation with the inmate, a fabrication that 
astoundingly remains in CCJ’s records as a valid grievance response,
even though they are aware of its falsification.234 In one such case.
CCJ only opened an investigation, seven months later, after the inmate
filed a lawsuit.235 
 
E. Study o
Has Been Unsuccessful in Its Objectives 
 
 1982, an analysis of the grievance files in these tw
ection
F dation, randomly selecting inmates and staff to intervie
grievance hearings and the grievance board were also observed.236 T
study made it clear that prison grievance procedures are diverse from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction and often from institution to institution as 
well.237 This finding is similar to those found in the CCJ, an 
investigation performed post-PLRA. The Department of Corrections’ 
regulations made reference to “locked mailboxes” for the dep
written grievances, but access to the procedure is much more informal
and varied.238 At Vienna, grievances, usually in the form of hand-
written notes rather than the requisite form, are given directly to the 
 
iscussing inmate Byron S. who filed a grievance after he an officer 
brok he 




e his jaw, but was denied an investigation in his grievance response because t
officer had falsely reported that Byron had previously attacked him, such that Byron 
was ruled “combative”). 
235 Id. 
236 Sam
te Grievance Procedures, 7 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 111, 114–15 (1982). 
237 See id. at 115. 
238 Id. at 116. 
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Institutional Inquiry Board, the grievance board, or an intermediar
Stateville’s arrangement is more random, using the IIB chairman to 
conduct hearings and allowing him to select random officials and 














                                                
240 Essentially, the grievance procedure
was created to: “(1) improve institutional management and problem
identification, (2) reduce inmate frustration and potential for prison 
violence, (3) increase the prospects of inmate rehabilitation, (4) keep
down the volume of litigation, and last, but not least, (5) promote 
‘justice’ in institutional relations and procedures.”241 Ironically, these 
problems persisted despite the prison grievance system, and the PL
which was established to address part, if not all, of these issues. 
The study revealed that it was often difficult to discern grievance 
report subject matter because of the aggregations in Stateville rep
 Vienna and Stateville grievance forms contained grievance 
category options that confused inmates.242 This does not appear to 
have improved as a result of the PLRA; the JHA and DOJ 
investigations disclosed confusion on the part of inmates on how to
classify or file their grievances in order to receive proper re
prison administration.243   
Inmates in Stateville and Vienna did not speak positively of the 
grievance system. Overall,
aper’ but that it does not work so well in practice, because the 
wrong people sit on the board, too little heed is paid to the inmates’ 
side of the dispute, too little time is taken to investigate, or just the 
opposite (no great paradox)—that the process takes too much time.”
Vienna prison guards also had strong negative opinions about the 
grievance procedure.245 Essentially, they felt that “(1) the procedure 
wasn’t needed, (2) the prisoners didn’t deserve it, and (3) prisoners
 
t 118. 




242 Id. at 123. 
243 See general
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abused it.”246 These views were duplicated for the most part in 
Stateville.247 Unfortunately, prison guard attitudes towards inmates 
filing grievance have rarely changed today, and most prison employees 
are still unhappy with the process. 
The Vienna and Stateville investigation advised that prison 





It has been established t ate grievance systems in 




the acceptance of inmate mistreatment and inhumane prison 
                                                
vances must be periodically reviewed in order to identify pat
and anticipate problems in prisons.248 Doing so would help formulate 
policies and procedures that adequately respond to them.249 
Furthermore, grievance procedures should be more formal and 
oriented; an idea that will give prisoners more faith in the sy 250
These proposals are still needed today, even in the wake of the P
enactment. Since it is apparent that it will be very difficult to 
restructure prison grievance systems because of the environment and 
attitude towards prisons, a broader interpretation of the right to
petition will give inmates the ability to exercise their right and 





ough incarceration is intended to be unpleasant punishment, “the
fact that prisons will always be unattractive places does not me
all inmate difficulties can be ignored.”251 While, it is not suggested 
that inmates have an automatic right to equality with free citizens, it is 
going too far to strip them of all constitutional protection and prolon
 
246 Id. at 127–28. 
247 Id. 
248 Id. at 129. 
249 Id. 
250 Id. at 136. 
251 Kenneth Adams, Adjusting to Prison Life: Stress, Coping and 
Maladaptation, 16 CRIME AND JUSTICE 275, 275 (1992). 
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conditions. Therefore, the test for an inmate’s constitutionally 
protected claim is best asserted by courts adopting the broad 
interpretation of the right to petition. Using this broad view a
inmates to proficiently navigate their way toward justice for wr
they have endured in Illinois prisons, often at the hand of pris
guards.  
Under the narrow view, a prisoner would have a very hard time 



















                                                
ensome environment and requirements of the grievance system, 
and giving little or no deference to the claim under the narrow 
interpretation makes success for inmates nearly impossible. The 
Department of Justice has proven this point in the aforementioned CC
study, revealing that when grievance systems are discombobula
lack the respect of prison administration, the result is mistreated a
dissatisfied inmates who have no faith in their rights as imprisoned 
Americans.252 Inmates who are discouraged with the grievance 
system, who do not understand the grievance system, or who are 
prevented from addressing their grievances are ultimately losers und
the PLRA, which was enacted both to protect inmates and eradicate 
“frivolous claims.”253 Investigations of Illinois state prisons prior to
the enactment of the PLRA reveal grievance system policy conce
still evident in today’s post-PLRA prisons. Meritorious claims 
disappear in Illinois prison grievances system, never to be adequately
resolved by the persons in charge of addressing them, and never to be
given fair review by courts adopting a narrow view of the right 
petition. These internal issues in prison grievance systems demonstrate
the limited ability to exercise the right to petition in prisons and the 
necessity for a broader scope of constitutionally protected claims to
brought to court. Until prison officials can respect that inmates have 
the right to seek review of prison conditions and guard conduct and a
strict fair grievance procedure that can be instilled, a narrow 
interpretation will not suffice. 
 
252 See generally DOJ Letter, supra note 194. 
253 See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. 
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 With the broad interpretation of the right to petition, courts are 
sufficiently bridging the gap between inadequate grievance sy
and the difficulties inmates fac
stems 




 them by 
d 





                                                
with a narrow interpretation. When an inmate brings a claim of 
retaliation for exercising his right to petition, or the filing of 
grievances in his prison, he will have a quicker turnaround for 
addressing the issue if the court has given the right to petition a 
broader scope. This does not mean exhaustion requirements u
PLRA need to be entirely thrown out. However, it is important 
PLRA be amended to include more reasonable requirements for 
inmates in these secluded prison environments. If the PLRA can be 
redrafted to contain uniform, strict requirements of prison 
administrations and their employees, this could lead to a better-ru
grievance system and environment for people who, although are 
inmates, should not completely lose those rights afforded to
the United States Constitution.   
 Prisons are labeled as environments where poor conditions an
mistreatment can be acceptable because they are responsible for 
housing criminals who have com
“ ile society no longer demands that inmates leave prisons change
for the better, it is both counterproductive and inhumane for inma
leave prisons in much worse shape than when they entered.”254 W
the negative attitude towards inmates is hard to eradicate, a strong 
effort on the part of Illinois prison administrations and the legislative 
body can assure that the actual intentions of the First Amendment are 




254 Adams, supra note 251, at 275. 
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